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NOTES
PRESENT STATUS OF OUR USURY LAW
The word usury is very familiar to all students of history
and law as it has been a part of both the spoken and written
languages of almost every nationality of people from biblical
time to the present day.
Many of the members of the Kentucky Bar and the Court of
Appeals of Kentucky have been in close touch with the question
recently as important eases have been brought to their attention
from almost every section of the Commonwealth. Probably one
of the chief reasons for this is that Kenfacky is a debtor state and
at different intervals since 1921 there has developed an urgent
need of credit in order that homes might be built to provide for
rapid increase of population in a community.
Almost all finance companies have been subjected to more
or less criticism on the score of the rates charged for their
service. Since brokers who procure loans for borrowers having
improved real estate to offer as security have been forced to resort
to the Court of Appeals, in order to decide the resistance they
have met in the collection of claims by counter-charges of usury,
in more cases than any other, this article will be conflned to that
branch of the subject.
Section 2218, Carroll's Kentucky Statutes, prescribes that
Iegal interest shall be at the rate of six dollars upon each one
hundred dollars for one year, and at the same rate for a greater
or less sum and for a shorter or longer time. The only qualification or modification of this rule is that a banking institution
is allowed to make a minimum charge of one dollar ($1) for any
loan negotiated at said institution.
In the case of Henderson Building and Loan Association v.
Johnson,' the Court holds that a building association might
exact reasonable dues in addition to legal interest. The Court
has not waivered from the general rule laid down in that case. 2
.188 Ky. 191.

Union Central Life Insurance Company v. Edwards, 219 Ky. 748;
294 S. W. 502; Webb v. Southern Trust Company, 11 S. W. (2nd) 988;
and Ashland National Bank, Trustee of an R pres&Trust v. A. f.
Conley et aL, 231 Ky. 844.
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All of the cases cited supra hold that the agent of the borrower
may exact a reasonable charge for services rendered in addition
to legal interest. What the Court may construe to be reasonable
or unreasonable charges in excess of the legal rate of interest,
in the absence of any standard to be found in the adjudicated
cases, is very different to predict, but it is safe to say that the
Court will look through the form to the substance.
FORm OF THE TRANSACTION NOT ]ATERIAL

Whether a transaction involving a loan of money is or is
not affected by the taint of usury, is a question of fact to be
decided by the court or.jury, after taking all of the evidence
into consideration in connection with the statutory definition
of usury. If the decisions of the Kentucky Court of Appeals
are read carefully the reader will form the conclusion and will
be firmly convinced that the substance, and not the form, of the
transaction is alone considered. If, in its substance, the transaction is of the character denounced by law, the penalties of
usury cannot be escaped by the fact that the transaction wears
a cloak or is put in an innocent form and that, judged by the
form alone, the usury could not be upheld. All of our state and
federal Courts, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals in particular, are very strict in holding that the consequences of
violating the usury statute are not avoided, no matter what
clever device may have been employed to conceal the true
character of the dealings involved.
It is very difficult in cases where the evidence reveals the
whole transaction, to draw a correct and logical conclusion as to
what constitutes and what does not constitute usury without
first ascertaining the tests applied by the court when they decide
the matter. A strict test is that something has been exacted for
the use of money in excess of the rate allowed by statute. If the
line of Kentucky decisions are followed we find that when they
apply a strict interpretation by disregarding form and inquire
whether the real substance of the plan is a loan of money for
more than 6 per cent interest per annum, and if the Court so
finds, then no device of form can relieve the taint of usury.
USURY AS AFFECTED BY SERVICE CITARGE

Almost all of the companies organized and operated in Ken-
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tucky for the express purpose of procuring loans for borrowers
derive their profits from monies received from borrowers as
service charges. There are about as many different plans
devised to collect such service charges as there are companies.
The plan of the Southern Securities Corporation, one of the
appellants in the ease of Askland National Bank, Trustee et at.
v. A. S. ConZey et al. is first to have the persons desiring to
borrow money sign an application form of contract designating
Southern Securities Company agent to procure a loan for them;
then have a deed of trust prepared to the Ashland National
Bank, Trustee of an Express Trust, setting up the principal
amount of the loan in a definite number of principal bonds which
are secured by a first and superior lien upon the real estate of
the borrower. All of said bonds are made payable to bearer and
bear interest at rate of 6 per cent per annum. This deed of trust
also provides for a definite number of subordinate notes payable
to bearer, secured by mortgage upon said premises, subordinate,
however, to the bonds and the interest coupons hereinbefore
referred to. These subordinate notes do not bear interest until
after maturity, and are executed for the expenses and fees connected with the loan. In order to provide a fund with which
to retire the bonds with interest coupons attached, and the notes
hereinbefore referred to, the borrower agrees to pay a certain
specified sum each month for 120 months.
The question as to what exact amount the courts will
permit to be exacted from a borrower for expenses is very problematical. Some brokers charge a flat rate of 5 per cent to 6 per
cent of the amount procured for the borrower and deduct same
from the' principal, while others follow a plan similar to that
adopted by Southern Securities Corporation, which from available figures in the case cited supra runs to about 6.9 per cent. It
is well settled that the court must be satisfied that the agreement
to compensate for services is not an attempt to conceal a usurious
transaction. The best way to avoid confusion on this subject is
to make the borrower understand at the time he makes his application that the company is not, loaning its own money and that
funds to take care of the amount he wishes to secure can be had
Cited supra note 2.
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only after labor and expenses have been incurred. The borrower
must then agree to reimburse these expenses.
The general attitude of the Kentucky Court of Appeals
upon the usury question is that of bias against all forms of contract involving interest charges in excess of 6 per cent and to
search for the possible intent to evade the usury statute by the
form of the contract.
All of the recent opinions of the Kentucky Court of Appeals
seem to be favorable to the contentions of the companies acting
as brokers. This fact might lead us to believe that the Court
is becoming more lax in enforcing the usury statute, but if we
examine the facts in any of these recent decisions more closely
we will flnd that the Court is just as strict in looking for a
scheme to avoid the usury statute as they ever were, and they
have decided the cases as they have, only after being firmly convinced that the company procuring the loan did so as the agent
of the borrower. It is also very apparent from this line of
decisions that the Court is probably not especially concerned
with the amount charged for services if they are convinced that
the company making the charge is the borrower's agent. The
"loan shark" cannot possibly be more secure in his dealings
than he has been previous to these recent decisions.
R. CI&7TokT SMOOT

